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 This work approaches the judicialization of the dispute over sexual and reproductive 
rights from the perspective of the social sciences. The article will focus its analysis on the 
characteristics of the process of judicialization of abortion in Mexico (from 2000 to 2002 and 
2007 – 2008) and in Colombia (2005 – 2006) as they represent paradigmatic cases involving 
these rights. 
 When the question of abortion enters the legal sphere, whether the issue is legalizing or 
criminalizing it with all of the implications in terms of criminalization, public health policy in 
general and sexual and reproductive health in particular, there can be no doubt that the quarrel 
extends beyond what is legal or illegal and is tied to the way adequate social order, ownership of 
one’s body, the relationship between public and private, faith and reason, state secularity, and 
above all sexuality, reproduction, and death are all conceived (Klein, 2005). Nonetheless, it must 
be recognized that when the debate over abortion passes from moral arguments or discussions of 
how to design and implement public policies into the legal domain at the behest of parties who 
either support or fight against it, a fundamental delegation of the power to resolve this dispute 
into the judicial branch takes place. This branch will decide in favor or against a determined 
legislative measure on the basis of determined reasons. 
 Specifically, this is an analysis of the power of the courts and abortion, aborting being 
understood as a particular case of expansion (or restriction) of rights through the judicial channel. 
                                                            
1 Profesora/ Investigadora FLACSO- México. Agradezco la generosidad de Marta Lamas para compartir literatura 
sobre el tema, asimismo agradezco la sesión de discusión mantenida con la delegación México del SELA la cuál 




As can be inferred from the previous paragraphs, the center of our attention will be the judicial 
branch. We will ask how it entered the conflicts over abortion in the cases analyzed and how it 
resolved them, or in other words, in what way the courts intervene to reach some determination. 
 The cases in Mexico and Colombia were chosen because the effects of the constitutional 
courts’ decisions were observationally equivalent, that is, they were in the end favorable to the 
extension of reproductive rights for women. The contrasting models offered by the courts, 
however, are a point of interest. The Mexican court can be characterized as prudent, organized 
more for politicians than for citizens, while the Colombian court can be called activist, much 
more open to the direct claims of citizens (Ansolabehere, 2008; Palacio, 2006, Wilson, 2007). 
An effort will be made to understand the trials corresponding to those decisions and determine 
the similarities and differences between the different courts’ decisions. 
 The first step will consist of synthetically structuring the analytical coordinates of the 
cases, with special attention on the literature of the judicialization of rights in general. Secondly 
the cases themselves will be analyzed, and thirdly, the conclusions will be presented.  
2. The Power of the Courts and Abortion 
 The starting points for this work are the changes that occurred in Latin America in 
consonance with the processes of democratization, with the changes in the equilibrium between 
branches of government (for example, through the increase of importance in the legislative and 
judicial branches) (Sieder et. al, 2005; Domingo, 2005), and the relationship between state and 
society, where social movements and other non-institutionalized forms of political action 
acquired special importance (Peruzzotti, 1997; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz). The judicial branch is 




more power through its capacity of constitutional control and through the broadened scope of 
matters for judicial attention, including those regarding rights in which the spread of 
international human rights law and the constitutionalization of a broad range of rights has had 
significant impact (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2008). The conflicts between legal decisions and the 
representative institutions are a sign of the times. The controversy has provoked fear in segments 
of the population at the marked progress of justice that are associated with notions such as a 
government of judges or juristocracy (Hirschl, 2003), or yet more skeptical ones regarding the 
capacity of the judiciary to effectively guarantee rights (Rosemberg, 2008). It has also, however, 
given rise to studies to analyses that examine the conditions and situations that enabled the 
judicial branch to become an actor that contributes to the extension of rights or an option for 
social change (Gargarella et al, 2004; McCann, 1991; Epp, 1998; Keck, 2008). 
 In this context, a few attempts have been made to explain the judicialization of rights 
(Epp, 1998; Sikkink, 2005; Wilson, 2008; Hilbink and Couso, 2009; Smulovitz, 2008). This 
literature emphasizes different factors of varying types: institutional design, the ideology of the 
courts, or the structures for social and political opportunities, the structure of legal opportunity, 
and the platforms for legal aid available to the actors promoting rights.2 It is important to stress 
that for analytical reasons, although it is not always obvious, the process of judicialization 
includes two dimensions: how the courts enter the conflict, that is, the delegation to the judicial 
                                                            
2 According to Smulovitz (2008: 290-292) different levels of factors related to judicialization can be identified: 1) 
structural factors: a) increasing complexity of societal conformation with the rise in number of identitarian groups 
that put into question the notion of political representation (which tends to homogenize across such groups), which 
makes the possibility of making specific demands through other means such as through the judicial branch an 
excellent option; b) problems of horizontal accountability for governments in the face of weakened parliaments, 
which lead to appeals to the judicial branch to perform their function; 2) Factors that explain judicialization on the 
basis of “changes in the conditions for [collective] action”. The author identifies three approaches in this category: a) 
the cultural approach – which associates the changes in judicialization with changes in the social value given law; b) 
the approach involving structures of legal and social opportunities, which maintains that the changes in 
judicialization are related to the crisis of the welfare state and the social reaction against relinquishing its 
accomplishments, and finally c) legal “support platforms”, that relate judicialization to the rise of organizations that 




branch the capacity to resolve the dispute, in our case, abortion; and secondly how the conflict is 
resolved, or the form in which the judicial branch intervenes and makes a determination in this 
conflict. 
 Now, as our principal interest is the process of judicialization of the 
criminalization/decriminalization of abortion in two distinct cases, it must not be ignored that 
historically the protagonist on the side of decriminalization in the struggle, in the region in 
general and in the two case studies in particular, has been the women’s movement in opposition 
to the Catholic Church along with the groups referred to as “pro life” on the side of 
criminalization (CLADEM, 1993; Lamas, 2008). It is a dispute whose progressive side is 
occupied by the women’s movement seeking an extension of sexual and reproductive rights, 
while the conservative faction has been led by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. These 
movements and actors are present in different ways in the processes of judicialization.3 
 Since we are seeking similarities and differences in the processes that enable us to 
identify why different courts arrive at similar decisions, there is no avoiding the central roles in 
the two cases studied of the women’s movement and the “pro life” movement (González Vélez, 
2006; Gire, 2008). Accordingly, in carrying out the proposed analysis, reference must be made to 
a body of literature that examines the relationship between judicialization and social movements, 
that is, the literature that, to use the terms of Smulovitz (2008), associates judicialization with 
changes in the conditions for collective action. 
                                                            
3 The use of the denomination feminist and women’s movement is intentional, in that reference is sought to the 
notion of a social movement, as it possesses the constitutive trait of heterogeneity, of functioning through informal 
networks, and the existence of shared beliefs that are mobilized around conflicting questions (Della Porta and Diani; 
Jelin 1986). This definition seeks to capture the sense that the feminist and women’s movement is organized 




 Regarding the characteristics of the cases, the basis for the analysis of the first aspect of 
the conflict will be the concept of legal and political opportunity structure proposed by Kathryn 
Sikkink (2008). Sikkink uses this scheme in relation to this concept to analyze the actions of 
human rights movements in response to the rights violations of the recent past during the military 
dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, in which special attention is paid to the 
combination of internal and international opportunities used to bring this type of violation before 
justice. The notion of political and legal opportunities is a depositary for the concept of political 
opportunity structure that was coined in the literature surrounding social movements (Tarrow, 
1994; McAdam, 1996; McAdam et. Al 2001), and refers to “the dimensions of the political 
environment that create incentives and restrictions for people undertaking collective action, 
affection their expectations for success or failure” (Sikkink, 2008:317). 
 Clearly the differences between the dispute over abortion and the cases of transitional 
justice that Sikkink refers to cannot be ignored. In the measure, nonetheless, that our subject is 
the legal opportunities for criminalizing or decriminalizing behaviors related to the protection of 
rights, with the right adjustments this conceptual framework can be applied in a comparative 
approach to the analysis of the judicialization of abortion.  
 The structures of legal opportunities are understood (in a sense that is analogous to the 
definition of the structures of political opportunities already outlined) as: the dimensions of the 
legal environment that establish incentives and restrictions in order for social movements to 





 As can be seen, the definition refers to dimensions of the legal environment, two of 
which we consider fundamental for our case:  
a) The degree to which representative institutions are open or closed to claims for the 
criminalization or decriminalization of abortion, meaning the characteristics of the 
legislative majorities and the position of the executive powers (local and federal) with 
regards the topic. 
b) What Charles Epp (1998) referred to as the support platforms for legal mobilization, that 
is, whether movements are able to count on the assistance of lawyers capable of bringing 
forth new cases with innovative arguments. The degree of consolidation of legal support 
structures will be examined. 
c) What Sikkink (2008) called the openness or closure of legal institutions to the 
participation of NGOs, or in other words, the degree of access of these organizations. It is 
considered that openness, in our case synonymous with the degree of citizen access to the 
jurisdiction of the highest constitutional courts in each country, can be categorized as 
open jurisdiction (when citizens can litigate directly before a constitutional court), as 
closed jurisdiction (when access to the jurisdiction of this court can only be achieved by 
means of a case’s attraction or because of specific alliances with actors with the 
competence for gaining access). 
 As for the second dimension of judicialization regarding the manner by which the high 
courts deliver sentences on the disputes, the intervention will be analyzed in terms of the court’s 
consideration of the essential questions of the matter (the position it takes on the sexual and 




address the deep issues and clearly indicate the political decisions that must be made will thus be 
qualified as maximalist, and court interventions that do not will be considered minimalist; that is, 
when the decisions say little about the substantive matters of the issue.4 
3.  Structures of Legal Opportunities: Legal Differences, Political Similarities? 
 From a conceptual point of view the discussions and dimensions of the analysis regarding 
abortion are many.5 Without ignoring the importance of these discussions, analyzing abortion 
from the point of view of its judicialization implies understanding it as a dispute over extending 
or restricting reproductive rights that is put before a court’s judgment. This qualification does not 
mean that when a court takes a decision on abortion that it is only acting on the question of rights; 
its decision has consequences in other areas as well: it also implies an idea of morality, a model 
of democracy, a model for the state, and a model of citizenship (Márquez Murrieta, 2007). 
 From the sociopolitical perspective, abortion is disputed territory between positions 
favorable to the decriminalization of abortion that find expression in determined moments as pro 
sexual and reproductive rights coalitions, generally comprised by the feminist movement and 
women in conjunction with other progressive actors (human rights movements, political parties, 
intellectuals, scientists, etc) and positions favorable to the criminalization of abortion that in 
determined moments find expression in pro life coalitions – as they refer to themselves – in 
general led by the most conservative Catholic sectors, the political parties closest to them, 
                                                            
4 There is discussion in the United States over the “desired” scope and depth of the Supreme Court’s decisions. Cass 
Sunstein (1999), for example, makes an argument in defense of minimalism in court decisions as way to achieve 
agreement in controversial cases where there is a plurality of positions or when it is not certain what decision is 
correct in terms of the consequences it may have on future decisions and democratic process. Sunstein’s defense 
presupposes, however, the condition of taking up substantive, fundamental question and so establishing minimal 
standards of interpretation. 
5 In it many tensions can be seen: between the domains of the private and the public, between privacy and the 
intrusion of the state, between abortion as strictly a matter of individual choice and abortion as a public issue, 
between abortion as a legal question of rights and abortion as a question of each woman’s unique experience (Salles, 




intellectuals, and other government workers. The high level of conflict that the issue generates 
often results in its delegation to the judiciary for resolution. 
 Here it must not be forgotten that the defense of calls to legalizing abortion has been long 
and loudly vindicated by the feminist movement since the 60s and 70s (Lamas, 2008). It was 
considered a concrete example of slogans such as “what is personal is political,” or the free 
exercise of sexuality. 
 In Latin America, abortion is illegal – at least is some of its forms – in most of the 
countries, the only exceptions being Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guyana (Lamas 2006). The 
configuration is such that the dispute over the issue has been, and continues to be, politically 
characterized by demands for change, for decriminalization, by the feminist movement and the 
pro sexual and reproductive rights coalitions on one side, and by the attempt to maintain the 
status quo on the part of pro life groups, generally headed by the most conservative sectors of the 
Catholic Church, on the other. In recent years, however, it should be remembered that there have 
been cases of regression with regard to the issue. El Salvador and Nicaragua are interesting 
examples in this sense. They are cases where the pro life coalition managed to change the status 
quo in a more restrictive sense of reproductive rights (Lamas, 2008). 
 The principal dispute over abortion in the region is thus relative to its legalization or 
more precisely its decriminalization. Despite this common denominator, however, the arguments 
that surround it are developed in many dimensions. One of them is that which opposes 
legalization to the clandestine abortions that are currently the common denominator. This is the 
equivalent of recognizing that abortions do occur, meaning that the dispute is between having 




and reproductive health for women in particular and public health in general (Klein, 2005; 
Lamas, 2006; Cook et. al, 2003). 
 Now, with this regional context as a backdrop, what has transpired in the countries 
studied? In both of them, in the first years of the 21st century, the highest courts took up the 
question and the decisions of each were favorable to the total or partial decriminalization of 
interrupting pregnancy. Beyond the differences we will soon analyze, the intervention of the 
judiciary favored decriminalization. In Mexico, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions 
in less than 10 years on the decriminalization of abortion arising from legislative actions in 
Mexico City. In 2000 the heard for the first time in its history a case on the issue, it was its 
initiation into this type of conflicts; in 2007 it heard the second case. 
 In August 2000 6  the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District [Mexico City] 
(henceforth the ALDF)7 approved a law8 that: 
1) Decriminalized abortion in cases of: a) fetal deformations, b) non-consensual artificial 
insemination, c) danger for the mother’s life; and  
2) Included other relevant aspects for the development of effective public policies on the 
issue: a) it established a simple and fast procedure for processing pregnancy interruption, and b) 
forced the public health system to provide information and timely consultation. 
                                                            
6 A un mes de las primeras elecciones presidenciales que marcaron la alternancia política en  70 años. Momento que 
para muchos autores, marca el fin de la transición democrática mexicana ( Woldemberg, Salazar y Becerra, 2001) 
7 No puede dejar de señalarse la incidencia fuerte del movimiento de mujeres en la iniciativa ( GIRE,2008) 
8 Conocida como Ley Robles, dado que Rosario Robles era la jefa de Gobierno de la Ciudad de México en ese 
momento y fue quién presentó la iniciativa poco tiempo después de haberse llevado a cabo las elecciones 





The National Action Party (PAN)9 and the Green Ecology Party (PVEM)10 filed an action before 
the Supreme Court contesting the law’s constitutionality 11  (Gire, 2008). The increasing 
pluralization of political representation generates new challenges for the highest court. 
 In this instance it is evident that both the local executive branch and the legislature were 
open to the influence of the women’s movement. The strategy of the movement concentrated its 
efforts on the representative institutions that offered an opportunity to advocate for a change in 
the normative framework: a left-leaning government headed by a woman, and a favorable 
majority in the legislature. 
 In November 2006, six years after the previous experience, and immediately following 
the closest presidential election in the country’s history, a new decriminalization initiative was 
brought forth in the ALDF. At this moment, although the political environment was marked by a 
majority in the ALDF and control of the local executive branch, the confrontation between the 
two institutions was deep as the leaders of each belonged to different factions of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD). In April 2007 the law decriminalizing abortions performed in the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy and furthermore specifying criteria for health center was approved 
(Gire, 2008). Two actions contesting the bill’s constitutionality were brought before the Court. 
This time they were not lodged by legislative minorities, but instead by the National Commission 
for Human Rights (CNDH) and the Solicitor General of the Republic (PGR). The primary 
institution for the protection of human rights in the country and the judicial arm of the Executive 
office were responsible for the Court’s being asked to decide the issue. They were looking to 
                                                            
9 The party in federal government that, although part of the minority in Mexico, is the only one whose platform 
defends the concept of life beginning at conception. 
10 The only ecologist party that maintains an antiabortion position. 
11 An appeal that can be brought to the Supreme Court if 33% of the legislature vote to have a law undergo judicial 




maintain the status quo, that is, to annul the legislation. For a second time the Court was obliged 
to make a determination in the dispute. 
 For its part, until 2006 Colombia was the only country in Latin America where there 
lacked any grounds whatsoever for legal abortion (González Vélez, 2006). Unlike in Mexico, 
judicialization was not initiated by the pro life coalition, but rather by the women’s movement. It 
was a feminist lawyer, Mónica Roa, who in the framework of a high impact litigation project 
(LAICA), and supported by the Women’s Link Worldwide in Colombia (González Vélez, 2006), 
coordinated the lawsuit asking that an article of the criminal code be declared unenforceable or 
that abortion be considered constitutionally permissible in specific situations: rape or 
nonconsensual artificial insemination, fetal deformation, danger to the mother’s life. It was not 
the first time a lawsuit had been brought before the court, but it is interesting to note that the 
initiative came from the women’s movement who chose to pursue the matter directly in the 
courts, probably in the hopes of propelling legislative changes. 12  The configuration of the 
political and legal opportunity structure favored the enterprise of broadening rights through the 
intervention of the Constitutional Court, whose jurisdiction is directly accessible to all citizens. 
Facing a conservative government with a majority in the legislature, an appeal was made for the 
court to intervene as a progressive arbiter in a key moment before changes could be made to the 
composition of the court that would render the initiative’s goals more difficult to achieve. 
 As for the legal opportunity structures in a strict sense of the term, the existence of legal 
support structures can be seen, that groups of lawyers from the movement or sympathetic to it 
that participate in the processes. In the opinion of those who participated in the Mexican process, 
                                                            
12 This is not strange given the characteristics of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which since its creation in 




however, distinction should be made regarding the existence of support structures controlled by 
the movement and those that lent the movement assistance. While in Colombia the legal support 
structure was its own, in Mexico the structure was basically borrowed.13  
 In addition, it seems that the strategy chosen in both cases was incrementalist, that is, it 
started by requesting decriminalization for the least controversial aspects of abortion (and in the 
case of Mexico also establishing procedures to correctly orient public policies), to later broaden 
the efforts. In Colombia, the video produced as a testimony to the experience14 states that it is the 
first step and that the court’s decision opens the door for new progress. Still another difference 
can be seen, as while in Mexico the strategy targeted representative institutions (the legislative 
assembly and government of Mexico City), in Colombia the strategy focused on the judiciary 
branch. Furthermore, in both cases the legal support structure includes collaboration between 
national and international organizations, especially evident in the case of Colombia, where the 
high impact litigation was part of a project by Women’s Link Worldwide. 
 The greatest discrepancy, however, between the two cases is found in the possibilities 
regarding access to the jurisdiction of the respective constitutional tribunals. While the 
jurisdiction of the Colombian court is open, broadly accessible to citizens and groups for 
declarations on the constitutionality of norms, in this case, the criminal code; the Mexican one is 
closed, its exclusive jurisdiction is reserved for resolving political conflicts, it is more a court for 
politicians than for citizens (Ansolabehere, 2008; Magaloni and Saldívar, 2006). 
                                                            
13 GIRE, the primary Mexican organization for the promotion of sexual and reproductive rights only had one 
specialist lawyer on the issue on its staff. The rest of the professional participants were recruited by a strategy 





 The second important difference is the starting point. In Mexico, this was a change in the 
legal status quo regarding abortion. The delegation of the matter for resolution by the judiciary 
was due to a conservative lawsuit. In both cases, appeals to the judicial branch were made to 
negate the advances made in the area of sexual and reproductive rights for women. Legitimate 
actors favorable to the pro life coalition were the ones who brought the lawsuit questioning 
constitutionality in the attempt to annul the change. The delegation to the judiciary was a 
conservative initiative. 
 For its part, in Colombia the delegation of the conflict to the judiciary was a progressive 
initiative seeking a change in the legal status quo. The women’s movement is what propelled it. 
A strategy was developed to take advantage of the particularities of the constitutional court then 
in existence. In the Mexican case the actors appealed to the court to maintain and restrict sexual 
and reproductive rights, in the Colombian one the appeal was to change and broaden those rights. 
 In both cases access, strictly speaking, to the court structure was complemented with 
consultation by interested third parties. In Colombia, part of the action plan of the organization 
that brought the appeal for unconstitutionality was to encourage the filing of amicus curae 
supporting decriminalization. In 2008 in Mexico, given the high level of visibility of the court’s 
decision over abortion (and given the discredit it had fallen into following a very controversial 
decision concerning the severe violation of the guarantees of individual freedom of a journalist 
who after exposing a child sex ring was detained with no regard for the rules of due process), the 
court institutionalized a technique that had been used in another controversial case (concerning 




established guidelines15 for convoking public hearings when it considers them pertinent because 
of the case’s nature. Public hearings were hence called for the conflict we are studying. Six 
hearings were carried out, 16  in which more than 40 speakers (individuals and institutions) 
participated in accordance to the positions they registered regarding the constitutionality (or 
unconstitutionality) of the measures. Beyond the conservative judicialization in Mexico between 
2002 and 2007 there was thus a period of learning. Although the jurisdiction remains closed, a 
change has occurred in that the court became less impermeable to society. Before an issue as 
disputed as abortion, the high court preferred hearing an exchange of arguments. The legal 
decision did not begin and end with the letter of the law; the legal decision, at least formally, was 
nourished with “knowledge from other sources.” These internal transformations can be seen as 
part of a process of increased publicizing for the court’s decisions: with its ruling on 
transparency and access to public information of 2003 that makes public final sentences and 
more concretely since 2006 when the court channel was inaugurated on television and the 
debates of the plenary were made public. 
 In both of our cases, we find similarities: the intervention of support structures for legal 
mobilization linked to the women’s movement or for sexual and reproductive rights. As for the 
differences, important ones exist, as the jurisdiction of the Colombian court is open to citizens, 
while the Mexican is not. In accordance with what we have noted thus far, together with the fact 
that the representative institutions were reticent to pay heed to the demands of the women’s 
movement, a progressive judicialization resulted. In this first case it was the women’s 
movement who called for judicialization. As for Mexico, where the strategy for change on the 
                                                            
15 No obstante estos líneamientos establecen el requisito de acuerdo del pleno para convocar a estas audiencias, esto 
es quedan supeditadas a la decisión discrecional de éstas,  constituyen un cambio por lo menos simbólico en cuanto 
a  la relación, entre la corte y diferentes actores sociales. 





part of the women’s movement had its center in the representative institutions of Mexico City, 
and where we face a closed jurisdiction, a conservative jurisdiction is had. The representatives 
of the antiabortion coalition are the ones who force delegation to the judicial branch for 
resolution of the conflict, although the changes between the court of 2000 and that of 2007 are so 
great that it is with difficulty that we can use the same name for them, not only because of the 
changes in the court’s composition, but also because of the changes in terms of the internal 
checks and balances internally adopted by the judiciary and the increase in public debate 
surrounding its decisions. 
 Therefore, with relation to the legal and political opportunity structure, what we have in 
the legal framework are differences in the openness of the representative institutions to the 
demands of the women’s movement and legal differences, in the legal framework and in the 
access to legal institutions, yet a fundamental political similarity does exist, that of the 
protagonist role of the women’s movement and the pro life movement in various stages of the 
process. 
4. Intervention and decision. Different court, different decision? 
 Sociologically, legal decisions regarding abortion can be understood, in terms of the 
moral and political factors they activate, as a critical conjuncture. The level of conflict and 
exposure that are normally harnessed can generate institutional, legal, and symbolical changes 
that burst inertia. In terms of legal history, they can be considered tragic (Vázquez, 2008) in that 
they involve genuine legal and moral dilemmas. Politically speaking, if we accept that judges in 
particular and courts in general are strategic actors (Epstein and Knight, 2000), these cases imply 




determinant inasmuch as what is given priority as beneficial will be determined at that decisive 
moment. 
 Taking these particularities of decisions on abortion into account, the way by which 
constitutional courts intervene, as well as the substance of their resolutions, are not minor factors, 
since, somehow, they establish a model of social and political order. Intervening to resolve this 
conflict, and the subsequent adjudication, is riddled with tension. Because of this, typifying the 
manner in which this function is carried out is considered important.  
 In this aspect of the analysis, the following dimensions are given priority: a) the conflicts 
to be resolved and b) the way in which they were resolved, that is, what the court’s position 
regarding the conflicts was. In the latter case, an examination will be made of whether the courts 
intervened in maximalist fashion, tackling the essential questions of the debate over sexual and 
reproductive rights; or if on the contrary they opted for a minimalist intervention by supporting 
their decision with formal arguments. 
 Let us begin with the Mexican case. In consideration are two decisions, the Action 
Contesting Constitutionality 10/2000 and the Action Contesting Constitutionality 146/2007 with 
its corollary 147/2007. 
 The Mexican Supreme Court accepted the modifications of the criminal code of the 
federal district [Mexico City] regarding the decriminalization of eugenic abortion in the Action 
Contesting Constitutionality 10/2000, besides including guidelines for public policy on the topic 
(services to be available in public hospitals, access to information, and the possibility for 
conscientious objection by doctors) (Pou Jiménez, 2009), despite holding that the concept of life 




to the court: one related to the constitutional right to life, and the other concerned the validity of 
allocating to public authorities the competence to approve interruptions of pregnancy. 
 Although the character of this decision of the court bestowed it with a high level of 
visibility, at the time there were no institutionalized means for representatives of the interested 
parties from society to participate in the trial. This does not mean that the work of the pro sexual 
and reproductive rights coalition and the pro life coalition, or better put pro and anti-decision, 
was without impact, but simply that participation was not regulated or public. Direct participants 
from the women’s movement refer to the process this way: “The trial was an experiment for the 
civil society organizations that backed the reform: the necessity to establish a dialogue with the 
highest instance of the Judiciary and, most difficult of all, with the intention of affecting the 
outcome. The task was not easy in the least, which is why the decision was made to limit 
ourselves to the sphere of information without putting pressure on civil society with 
demonstrations and sit-ins.” (Gire, 2008: 17). Beyond the questions abortions raises in terms of 
bioethics, medicine, and public health, that is, it appears that in this occasion, the conflict was 
entirely fought out in the legal arena. In the decision references to any other knowledge than 
legal are extremely scarce. Those who had been delegated the competence to resolve a complex 
conflict did not produce a complex response to it. 
 Lastly, closely related to what has just been said, the resolution of the principal conflicts 
regarding rights and criminal law share the common denominator of a failure to address the heart 
of the matter. On one hand, the court recognized that the Mexican constitution protects life from 
the moment of conception: “it can be thus concluded that the protection of the life of the product 
of conception derives from the constitutional precepts, the international treaties, and the federal 




that, as the change in the criminal code in question did not decriminalize abortion but instead 
concerned the sanction imposed and therefore did not mean that abortion was no longer a crime 
but rather that in certain scenarios it did not merit punishment, it was not denying protection to 
the unborn child: “[The reformulated article] does not hold that certain products of conception, 
because of their characteristics, may be deprived of life, which would de discriminatory, but 
rather that the substance of the section is that after an abortion is carried out . . . if the 
requirements listed in seciont III of Article 334, then the sanctions cannot be applied” 
(AI10/2000:112).17 
 Outside of the result, which was celebrated as a victory, the manner by which the court 
intervened in the conflict was clearly minimalist. In 2002, from a legal perspective, nothing in 
the arguments recognized rights sensitive to sex (Lamas, 2008) and the sexual and reproductive 
rights of women were not explicitly recognized. In its decision the court chose to avoid 
confrontation with the obligation to protect life from conception and with the criminal nature of 
abortion. Another aspect of this decision deserving attention is that it is not sustained by rigorous 
argumentation, either by any of the intervening parties or in the interpretative activity of the 
court itself. In 2007, however, every one of the intervening actors was seen making use of 
argumentation, the level of sophistication of which was much greater. In all appearance, the 5 
years interceding between the two decisions were not innocuous in terms of litigation practices 
or the ways by which settlement for the conflict is sought. 
 In 2007, not only the scenario differs, but so does the court’s intervention. The political 
scenario is polarized, the divisions between the models for the country forwarded by the left and 
the right, to somehow define it, are very clear. Sexual and reproductive rights represented a new 
                                                            




opportunity for differentiation. For its part, the judicial context has also changed. The supreme 
court is aware that its decisions have unknown transcendence for Mexico, and are subject to the 
balance of negative and positive effects of public opinion. The decisions are no longer only of 
interest to lawyers, they are material for commentary in the media and by the citizens. A court 
may be loved18 or hated.19 In other words, the social context of exigency in the court has changed. 
Whether a cause or consequence of this is unimportant; the court has become more public – its 
decisions are available to the public and its sessions are broadcast on a television channel. 
Furthermore, the composition of the court itself has changed, as 4 of its 11 members have been 
replaced. 
 The institutionalization of public hearings, to which reference has already been made, and 
the calls to participate in them represent the first significant change with respect to the 2002 
decision. On one hand, the task of examining impact was made explicit and an effort was made 
to sustain it during the debate. On the other hand, the diversity of participating actors in the 
hearings, where besides the organizations tied to the defense of sexual and reproductive rights 
there were health professionals, specialists in bioethics, etc., together with the requests for 
statistical data from various federal entities handling questions related to public health,20 make it 
possible to infer that a change was made in the way the problem was tackled. Its being a difficult 
problem, complex responses are required. Assembling an adequate response to the problem can 
not only rely on legal knowledge, it requires other expertise. 
 In this case the court was assigned a conflict articulated in three tracks: a) that of rights 
(the right to life from conception – the right to health and to life of women), b) that of the 
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19 As in the case of Lidia Cacho. 




jurisdiction between the federal government and the federal district, that is, there was a 
dimension where conflict over the competences of the federal government and states was 
arbitrated, and c) the court finally addressed the conflict tied to the characteristics of the criminal 
law. Regarding the court’s intervention, the first thing that can be said is the only true decision in 
the strict sense of the term was that the Mexico City legislation was constitutional. It is possible 
to speak of a concurrence so thin that it is only possible to issue a decision on whether the 
contested legislation was constitutional or not, but not on the reasons to sustain it. A majority of 
8 votes were favorable to the constitutionality of the norm, and seven concurred with the 
decision elaborated by the judge appointed to write the opinion of the court (José Ramón Cossío). 
 As regards the first conflict, two arguments were put forward in the decision. The first is 
that the Mexican constitution does not explicitly recognize the right to life, and that even if it 
were recognized it clearly is not an absolute right with preeminence over all other rights, for 
example equality and freedom: “If the right to life was found to be expressly recognized in the 
constitution, by any manner this would be as a relative right, and in consequence would have to 
be harmonized with another collection of rights” (AI 146/2007 and 147/2007:156). The second 
argument involves the recognition of the differences entailed by sex in the exercise of sexual and 
reproductive rights following the admission of the differing implications pregnancy has for the 
mother and for the father. The law recognizes sex, at least in one paragraph: “This tribunal 
considers that the means employed by the legislator is in the end suitable for protecting the 
rights of women, as the non-prosecution of pregnancy interruption has as counterpart the 
freedom of women to make decisions regarding their bodies, their physical and mental health, 
and even their lives” (AI 146/2007 and 147/2007:181). In some way this interpretation represents 




 The second conflict was of jurisdiction, and the court’s decision was a resounding 
affirmation regarding the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City to pass 
legislation on health issues. 
 The third conflict regarded the legislation on punishment for abortion, and here the court 
showed deference to a position, which would be the primary reason for the decision (Pou 
Giménez, 2009) and an important difference from the 2002 decision, in which punitive action is 
deemed the last recourse for use by the state, and even more rightly so when it restricts freedom: 
“Thus having found no specific constitutional mandate for the punishment for all of these 
behaviors, no legal reason appears to exist . . . indicating to us that there lacks sufficient legal 
authority to decriminalize those behaviors that in the judgment of a democratic legislator are no 
longer socially reproachable” (AI 146/2007 and 147/2007:180). In the end the measure, in the 
court’s judgment, is constitutional because the democratic legislature has the necessary 
authorization to pass it. 
 In 2007, we have a court that beyond the differences with the 2002 decision, opted for a  
minimalist strategy.21 In the end the primary foundation of the resolution is the lack of any 
obstacle to prevent a democratic legislator from deciding whether to criminalize or stop 
criminalizing abortion. There are nonetheless differences with regards the 2002 court; the first is 
that women are present, although in the background they are still present. The second difference 
is that expertise from other areas was sought, for example from that of medicine, during the 
process of the decision’s construction. The third is the greater effort made in argumentation. In 
light of these characteristics we might define the court’s intervention as minimalist, but sensitive 
to sex, more informed and more rigorously argued. There is room to believe that the Mexican 
                                                            




court, with its higher degree of visibility and presence in the public debates, has become more 
susceptible to political and social influence and consequently to the social and political costs its 
decisions entail, than to an exhaustive legal debate. 
 In the case of Colombia, whose court is held as a model of pro rights activism in the 
region (Uprimy, 2005; Ansolabehere, 2008), it is not surprising that the intervention was 
maximalist. The background of its decision included consultation with various types of 
organizations, ranging from organizations defending and promoting the sexual and reproductive 
rights of women to the Colombian Episcopalian conference, as well as scientists and government 
workers, both for and against the decriminalization of abortion. As for the decision itself, both 
the petition22 and the text of the decision rested not only on legal arguments but also made 
reference to health statistics and recommendations by committees monitoring the implementation 
of treaties covering the human rights of women.23 
 The primary conflict in Colombia is related to the decriminalization of abortion in 
specific cases: therapeutic, eugenic, or following rape or nonconsensual artificial insemination. 
Nonetheless, both the lawsuit brought over the conflict as well as the intervention of the court are 
worded in terms of women’s rights. The lawsuit brought forward by the women’s movement 
maintains that Article 122 of the Criminal Code of that country is unconstitutional for 
infringement of the following rights of women: 1) the right to equality and the obligation of 
respecting the guidelines in international law for human rights; 2) women’s right to life, health, 
and safety; 3) the right to equality and to be free of discrimination; 4) the principle of human 
                                                            
22 On page 24, for example, of the petition of unconstitutionality of Art. 122 of Law 599 of 2000 of the Criminal 
Code filed by Mónica Roa. 




dignity and the right to reproductive autonomy and individual self-realization. Unlike the case in 
Mexico, women were present at all times. 
 In its decision, the court revises the constitutional protection of the various rights 
mentioned in the lawsuit and reaffirms the intimacy and limitations on state intervention in these 
areas stemming from the liberal nature of the 1991 constitution, stating: “ . . . the State is at the 
service of man, the man is not at the service of the State. Under this new perspective, individual 
autonomy – understood as vital sphere of questions that only concern the individual – takes on 
the character of constitutional principle joining the public authorities to those who are forbidden 
from interfering in this protected area” (C-355:247). 
 Although the court affirms the state’s responsibility to protect the unborn child, it 
considers that “criminal regulations that punish abortion in any circumstance corresponds to a 
revocation of the basic rights of women, and inasmuch implies a complete disregard for their 
dignity, reducing women to the status of mere receptacles for the life in gestation, lacking rights 
or relevant interests which warrant protection” (C-355:271). 
 In addition, it is important to emphasize that the Colombian court finishes by making 
reference to the competence of the democratic legislator to further broaden the range of cases for 
decriminalization, which opens the door for greater amplification of sexual and reproductive 
rights. 
 The differences of manner in the interventions we have studied are obvious, beyond the 
differences between 2002 and 2007, the Mexican court remained marked by a minimalist 
approach. The Colombian court, however, accordingly with its well-known actions in other 





 We have seen that in Mexico as well as Colombia, the conflict surrounding the 
decriminalization of abortion reached the constitutional courts. And we have seen that in both 
cases, beyond the differences in the profile of each court, the decriminalization of abortion was 
upheld, and that the content of the decisions and their reach can be traced back to the differences 
in the profile of each court. 
 For strictly analytical reasons, we reconstructed these processes of decriminalization in 
two phases, how they were remitted to the court system, and the nature of the court’s 
intervention in resolving the conflict. The first important conclusion, however, is that the latter 
phase cannot be understood with considering the former. In any case, it is the particularity of the 
first moment that enables us to understand the particularity of the second. In our case this is 
because two very different courts reached opinions favorable to the decriminalization of abortion, 
yet the decisions were significantly different in content and reach. 
 Regarding the first process, we found fundamental differences in the structure of political 
and legal opportunities, so much so that we can justifiably speak of a court open to citizens in 
Colombia and a closed one in Mexico – and of representative institutions open to the demands 
for the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico and closed to them in Colombia. 
 The results give cause to believe that the legal opportunity structure cannot be dissociated 
from the political opportunity structure of not only the movements but also of the courts 
themselves. The timing, the level of access, the publicity strategy devised for the problem and 
the political mobilization implemented by the women’s movement, and that of the Catholic 




 Still, the profiles of the courts are also important, regardless the strategies of the parties in 
conflict, in both a strict and broad sense, as these are expressed in the content and reach of their 
decisions. The Colombian court intervened in maximalist fashion by issuing an opinion that 
addressed the core principles of the issue in a clear recognition of sexual and reproductive rights 
as well as the autonomy of women. The Mexican court, putting aside the differences that 
separate the 2002 court from the 2007 one, is characterized by a minimalist intervention that 
resolves the conflict without confronting the deeper issues, although there is improvement. It 
seems that in this second case, the greater degree of visibility and public debate over its decisions, 
as well as the exigency in the social context, pressured for maintaining the contested norms, 
though not with sufficient force to change the terms of the legal debate. On this point there may 
be room for the idea that the degree of openness of legal institutions to the citizenry is important, 
and that it is important because of the decisions it entails. A lawsuit challenging constitutionality, 
as in the Mexican case, that can only be brought forward by political minorities or political 
institutions, transforms the decision regarding rights into an strictly political conflict in which the 
court must intervene to arbitrate. In Colombia, however, the direct access to jurisdiction for 
citizens appears to have contributed to the fact that a decision over rights fundamentally 
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